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The Case for Extending Pretrial Diversion
to Include Possession of Child Pornography
Sarah J. Long
9 U. MASS. L. REV. 306
ABSTRACT
Pretrial diversion removes offenders with a low-risk of reoffending from the penal
system and instead sends them to supervised treatment programs. The result is lower
cost to the state and a second chance for those who successfully complete the
program.
Typically, violent crimes, such as murder and attempted murder, are exempt from
pretrial diversion. Notably, sex related crimes are also ineligible in all jurisdictions.
By excluding all sex-related crimes from pretrial diversion, possession of child
pornography is adjudicated by the courts. As a result, young, first-time offenders
who may be candidates for treatment are bundled with physical offenders, members
of child pornography “circles,” and rapists, charged as felons, and faced with fifteen
years as a registered sex offender.
While this may make the public feel safe, it eliminates an option for those who could
truly benefit from pretrial diversion. By offering pretrial diversion for “simple”
possession of child pornography, offenders who are unlikely to reoffend or to
escalate their actions will receive necessary treatment, making it more likely that
they move forward and become productive law abiding citizens.
AUTHOR
Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Massachusetts School of Law, 2014; BEng.
Electrical, McGill University, 1983.
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I. INTRODUCTION

P

retrial diversion moves certain offenders who meet strict criteria
out of the mainstream criminal justice system and allows them to
participate in treatment programs that have been preapproved by the
jurisdiction.1 Those who successfully complete the treatment program,
and meet other conditions, effectively have their criminal charges
dismissed.2 Pretrial diversion has been available to qualifying adult
offenders since the late 1960s3 and has proven to be both successful4
and cost effective.5
Those charged with possession of child pornography are generally
not eligible for pretrial diversion.6 They should be. By bundling
possession of child pornography with the broad category of criminal
sex offenses, jurisdictions are forfeiting an opportunity to divert and
treat non-physical offenders who have no criminal record and who
may benefit from treatment. Without this opportunity, those convicted

1

2
3

4

5

6

See generally, Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L ASS’N OF
PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES 1, 9 (2006), http://www.pretrial.org/documentsearch-results/?wpfb_s=promising&search=Search.
Id.
John P. Bellassai, A Short History of the Pretrial Diversion of Adult Defendants
from Traditional Criminal Justice Processing Part One: The Early Years,
NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, 1, 2, www.napsa.org/publications
/diversionhistory.pdf.
See Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 16 (referencing
survey response indicating eighty-five percent “successful program completion
rate”); and Thomas E. Ulrich, PreTrial Diversion in the Federal Court System,
66 FED. PROBATION 33, 5–6 (2002) (noting “satisfactory disposition was
achieved in eighty-eight percent of the cases”).
See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Prosecution Backs Alternative to Prison for Drug
Addicts, 19 CRIM. JUST. 2, 2 (Summer 2004) (thirty-eight percent savings per
inmate per year in New York); Kate Cahoy et. al., SB114: Improving Pretrial
Diversion to Meet the Unique Needs of Connecticut’s Veterans, YALE LAW
SCHOOL, 6–8 (February 2012), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics
/SB114White_Paper.pdf (sixty-four percent estimated savings per day in
Connecticut).
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-696 (2009) (referencing list of offenses
inapplicable for pretrial probation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276A, § 4 (2012)
(same); Diversion Guidelines, OFFICE OF DIST. ATT’Y, 18TH JUDIC. DIST. OF
KAN., available at http://www.sedgwickcounty.org/da/documents/CR%20
Diversion%20Form%20.pdf (excluding all sex offenses from consideration for
pretrial diversion).
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of possessing child pornography may be charged with a felony, face
incarceration, and be required to register as a sex offender for up to
fifteen years upon release.7
This Note recommends pretrial diversion as an option for those
charged with possession of child pornography who meet a strict set of
guidelines. This Note does not address the seriousness of the crime of
possession of child pornography, nor does it discuss the effect that
child pornography has on those depicted. Those debates are emotional,
highly charged, and continue to be broadly discussed.8 Further,
addressing those issues would be as helpful to the context of the
argument as discussing whether drug use and possession are serious
crimes that victimize others. This Note solely focuses on the
advantages pretrial diversion provides to the state and to those
offenders who meet a strict set of guidelines.
Part II of this Note reviews the evolution of pretrial probation from
a federal experiment in New York to widespread use throughout the
country. Part III discusses a brief history of the law and sentencing for
the crime of possession of child pornography. Part IV then argues that
extending the already narrowly tailored pretrial diversion option to
include those charged with possession of child pornography will be in
line with two of the primary goals of pretrial diversion—providing
second chances to those who qualify and saving the state money. The

7

8

18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2012) (setting punishment for possession of child
pornography); 42 U.S.C. § 16915(A) (2012) (providing the sex offender
registration requirements); see also Stephanie Buntin, The High Price of
Misguided Legislation: Nevada’s Need for Practical Sex Offender Laws, 11
NEV. L.J. 771 (2011) (discussing Nevada’s sex offender laws).
Compare Ashleigh B. Boe, Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring
Defendants Who Possess Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child
Pornography Victims, 86 N.D. L. REV. 205 (2010) (recommending child
pornography possession offenders compensate those depicted in the images),
and Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV.
847 (2008) (supporting the theory that each time an image is viewed, more harm
is done to the person depicted), with Jelani Jefferson Exum, Making the
Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for
Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16, RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8
(2010) (recommending a more practical approach to sentencing for possession
of child pornography), and Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child
Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 545, 571–72 (2011) (noting that judges rarely find it useful to
consider that revictimization occurs when child pornography is viewed).
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argument proposes that allowing pretrial diversion for those who
qualify will not put the public at increased risk of these offenders and
in fact, will likely result in decreased instances of reoffending.
II. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF PRETRIAL PROBATION
A. Initial Focus on Juvenile Offenders
Conrad P. Printzlien is credited with creating the first pretrial
diversion program.9 Printzlien left his former position in the United
States Attorney’s Office to become the second United States Probation
Officer for the Eastern District of New York.10 Printzlien went on to
create a unique program for juvenile offenders.11 In describing the
experiment, later referred to as the Brooklyn Plan, Printzlien remarked,
“[t]here is a step ahead: an effort to eliminate legal procedure, in the
technical sense. Whatever legal procedure is invoked, no matter how
efficiently it is carried through, nor with what intelligence and humane
insight it is administered, it always leaves an indelible mark—a
record.”12 Printzlien posited, “[w]hy not . . .conduct an investigation
prior to prosecution to determine whether or not prosecution in the
first instance was warranted or necessary?”13
To answer that question, Printzlien approached the United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York and offered the services
of the probation office to implement that very investigation program.14
In short, the probation department would:
[c]onduct an investigation of the juvenile’s background prior to
then after prosecution. In the event that the investigation of a
youthful offender indicated a substantial background, good home
influences, no previous convictions, then on the strength of the
preliminary report, coupled with the information submitted by the

9

10
11
12

13
14

Stephen J. Rackmill, Printzlien’s Legacy, The “Brooklyn Plan,” A.K.A.
Deferred Prosecution, 60 FED. PROBATION 8 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Conrad P. Printzlien, Deferred Prosecution: Provisional Release of Juvenile
Delinquents, 7 FED. B.J. 278 (1946) (grammar and punctuation in original).
Id. at 279.
Id.
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investigating agencies of the government, a determination could be
15
made not to prosecute.

The Brooklyn Plan was fine-tuned over seven years and resulted in
an endorsement by United States Attorney General Tom Clarke, who
recommended its use by all United States attorneys in 1946.16
Pretrial diversion remained focused on juvenile offenders and
operated throughout the country without procedural or statutory
authority until 1964, when the Department of Justice formalized the
use of deferred prosecution in an official memorandum.17
Interestingly, while the memorandum explicitly reserved deferred
prosecution for juveniles, the results of a questionnaire issued by the
United States Department of Justice as part of a formalization effort
indicated that forty-eight percent of all individuals receiving deferred
prosecution supervision were adults.18
B. Broader Acceptance
By 1967, several states had enacted legislation modeled after the
Brooklyn Plan and the federal memorandum.19 More importantly, that
year the Report on the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
& Administration of Justice (Presidential Report) was released.20 The
340-page document commissioned by Lyndon B. Johnson made “more
than 200 specific recommendations—concrete steps the Commission
[believed could] lead to a safer and more just society.”21 Among them,
“[e]arly identification and diversion to other community resources of
those offenders in need of treatment, for whom full criminal

15
16
17
18
19

20
21

Id.
Rackmill, supra note 9, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Bellassai, supra note 3, at 2 (citing Connecticut, Illinois, and New York
legislation).
Id.
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE V (1967).
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disposition [did] not appear required.”22 The recommendations were
not limited to simply juvenile offenders.23
The Presidential Report, in some respects, legitimized what may
have been considered experiments in pretrial diversion. In the 1970s,
both the number of state jurisdictions adopting pretrial diversion
legislation, as well as institutional recognition, increased.24 Notably,
the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment was
released and included a section on pretrial diversion.25
C. Pretrial Diversion Today
Today, pretrial diversion programs exist under federal law, under
state law in forty-five states, in the District of Columbia, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.26 Pretrial diversion programs in general involve two
hurdles which offenders must overcome in order to be considered.
First, offenders must comply with a “risk and needs assessment.”27
Conditions are predetermined by jurisdiction and are based upon
factors such as the type of offense and the criminal history of the
offender. For example, by statute, Kansas provides a minimum list of
factors that must be considered before an offender may be admitted
into a pretrial diversion program.28 In addition to considering such

22
23
24
25

26
27
28

Id. at 134.
Id.
Bellassai, supra note 3, at 6.
Id. at 7 (referencing the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 320.5 (1975)).
Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 1.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2908 (2012). The minimum factors are:
“(1) The nature of the crime charged and the circumstances
surrounding it; (2) any special characteristics or circumstances of
the defendant; (3) whether the defendant is a first-time offender
and if the defendant has previously participated in diversion,
according to the certification of the Kansas bureau of investigation
or the division of vehicles of the department of revenue; (4)
whether there is a probability that the defendant will cooperate
with and benefit from diversion; (5) whether the available
diversion program is appropriate to the needs of the defendant; (6)
the impact of the diversion of the defendant upon the community;
(7) recommendations, if any, of the involved law enforcement

2014

Pretrial Diversion and Child Pornography

313

factors as the nature and circumstances of the crime, likelihood to
reoffend, and whether the offender has any prior convictions,
acceptance into a pretrial diversion program may require victim
notification and approval, restitution by the offender, and a
psychological assessment of the offender.29
The second hurdle which an offender must overcome in a pretrial
diversion program is to accept and follow the conditions for release.30
Again, such conditions are generally predicated by the offense and
include requirements such as attendance at a state recognized
treatment or counseling program, community service, restitution, and
regular urinalysis testing.31 Throughout the program, the offender is
generally supervised by the probation department or its equivalent.32
Offenders who are granted pretrial diversion but fail to meet the terms
of his or her diversion agreement are either given increased pretrial
sanctions or are removed from the program and reentered into the
courts for adjudication on the original charge.33
D. Does it Work?
There are two primary considerations when addressing whether
pretrial diversion is effective. The first is the overall success of the
program as an alternative to incarceration. The second is the cost
savings to the jurisdiction implementing the program.
A recent nationwide survey demonstrated an eighty-five percent
successful program completion rate for those who are accepted into a

agency; (8) recommendations, if any, of the victim; (9) provisions
for restitution; and (10) any mitigating circumstances.
Id.
29

30

31
32
33

See id.; see also A Guide to Special Sessions & Diversionary Programs in
Connecticut, JDP-CR-137 (2012) http://jud.ct.gov/Publications/CR137P.pdf
(providing similar requirements used in Connecticut).
See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 320.5(d) (1975)
(defining rehabilitation as one of the conditions to which the prosecution and the
accused may agree); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS
OF GUILTY 11–12 (American Bar Association ed., 3rd ed. 1999) (recommending
diversion agreements be in writing).
Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 12–13.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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pretrial diversion program.34 On the federal level, a detailed analysis of
the pretrial diversion program demonstrated an eighty-eight percent
“satisfactory disposition” rate.35 While different programs have
different results,36 the overall view of pretrial probation is that, for
those who meet the qualifications, it is a viable, useful alternative to
incarceration.37
Providing an alternative to incarceration benefits not only the
offender but the government as well. The prosecution saves resources,
time, and money on pre-trial and trial preparation.38 The Court saves
resources and the docket is cleared for more serious cases.39 While the
cost of treatment is higher for diversionary cases, the costs of
incarceration and probation may be reduced.40 An example of the
savings can be seen in a report prepared for the New York State
Unified Court System, which calculated an average savings of $5,564
per participant in state-wide drug courts.41 The report focused on
judicial diversion, which takes place later in the adjudication cycle and
therefore does not include savings recognized for programs that divert

34

35

36

37

38
39
40

41

Id. at 16. Success as measured in the survey used for this report predominantly
included completing the program. Many jurisdictions included in the survey did
not maintain recidivism information. Id.
Thomas E. Ulrich, PreTrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, 66 FED.
PROBATION 33, 33 (2002).
See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Prosecution Backs Alternative to Prison for Addicts,
19 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 27 (citing a 2003 report showing over fiftytwo percent of 1,000 participants enrolled in the Drug Treatment Alternative-toPrison program since the year 2000 “graduated”).
See Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 16. See also No
Entry: A National Survey of Criminal Justice Diversion Programs and
Initiatives, CENTER FOR HEALTH AND JUSTICE AT TASC, 1, 17 (Dec., 2013),
http://www2.centerforhealthandjustice.org/sites/www2.centerforhealthandjustice
.org/files/publications/CHJ%20Diversion%20Report_web.pdf.
See Printzlien, supra note 13, at 285.
Id.
NPC Research and Center for Court Innovation, Testing the Cost Savings of
Judicial Diversion, 1, 40 (Mar. 2013), http://www.pretrial.org/wp-content
/uploads/filebase/diversion/Testing%20the%20Cost%20Savings%20of%20%
20Judicial%20Diversion%20-%20Center%20for%20Court%20Innovation%20
et%20al%202013.pdf (focusing on drug courts and judicial diversion).
Id. at 39.
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participants earlier in the process.42 The savings from other programs,
therefore, should be even greater.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION AND
SENTENCING
A. Obscenity and the Supreme Court
Before discussing the evolution of child pornography legislation, it
is important to understand two seminal Supreme Court cases dealing
with obscenity: Roth v. United States43 and Stanley v. Georgia.44
Roth involved two consolidated cases each with defendants in the
business of selling books, magazines, and other materials.45 The
defendants solicited business through flyers and circulars.46 Samuel
Roth, resident of New York, had been convicted for violating the
federal obscenity statute.47 David Alberts, resident of California, had
been convicted for violating the California Penal Code.48 The ultimate
issue in both cases was whether obscene speech was protected under
the First Amendment.49 In holding that obscene speech was not
protected, the court stated:
[a]lthough this is the first time the question has been squarely
presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under
the Fourteenth Amendment, expressions found in numerous
opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that obscenity
50
is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50

Id. at 3.
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Roth, 354 U.S. at 479–81.
Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 479. The issue in David Albert’s case was under the Fourteenth
Amendment because of his conviction under state law. Id. While the Court
addressed each conviction in turn, the focus of the case is whether obscene
speech enjoys Constitutional protections. Id. at 481, 492-494.
Id. at 481 (internal citations omitted).
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This was the first broad decision by the Court confirming that
obscenity was not protected speech and thus state and federal laws
restricting or outlawing it were not unconstitutional.51
Twelve years after Roth, the Court considered another obscenity
case in Stanley v. Georgia.52 In Stanley, federal and state police had
secured a search warrant to investigate bookmaking activities at the
defendant’s home.53 While executing the warrant, the police came
upon material they deemed to be obscene. Stanley was convicted of
violating Georgia state law for “knowingly hav(ing) possession of . . .
obscene matter.”54
In overturning the defendant’s conviction, the Court distinguished
the case from Roth, emphasizing the fact that Stanley’s conviction had
been for the private possession of the material:
[n]one of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the
proposition that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is
not protected by the freedoms of speech and press’ were made in
the context of a statute punishing mere private possession of
obscene material; the cases cited deal for the most part with use of
the mails to distribute objectionable material or with some form of
public distribution or dissemination. Moreover, none of this
Court’s decisions subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for
55
private possession of obscene materials.

Hence, Roth was not overruled, but rather an exception was carved
out which allowed “the States [to] retain broad power to regulate
obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by
the individual in the privacy of his own home.”56
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority in Stanley, and
has been lauded for the manner in which he addressed privacy rights in

51

52
53
54
55
56

Prior to Roth the Supreme Court had not ruled on the definition of obscenity or
whether it was protected by the First Amendment. Donovan W. Gaede,
Comment, Constitutional Law—Policing the Obscene: Modern Obscenity
Doctrine Re-Evaluated, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439, 441 (1994).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 558–59.
Id. at 560–61 (emphasis added).
Id. at 568.
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light of the First Amendment in his holding.57 In Stanley, Justice
Marshall notably stated:
[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
58
the power to control men’s minds.

The pendulum favoring First Amendment rights would soon swing
back.
B. Child Pornography Legislation
Before 1977, fewer than six states had enacted statutes prohibiting
child pornography59 and there were no such statutes at the federal
level.60 By 2011, every state had enacted child pornography laws and
Congress had enacted and amended legislation multiple times, often in
rapid response to Supreme Court decisions.61
The states were the first to become aware of the lack of legislation
regarding child pornography.62 As the use of children to create
pornography increased, the interstate nature of the resulting videos and
images also increased.63 Faced with few resources and a growing
problem, the states pressured Congress for federal involvement.64
Congress responded and, in 1977, The Protection of Children Against

57

58
59

60
61

62
63
64

See, e.g., J. Clay Smith, Jr. & Scott Burrell, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the
First Amendment, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 461, 464 (1994) (noting, inter alia, that a
recent tribute to Marshall by the members of the Bar of the Supreme Court
included his stand in the Stanley case).
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
Todd J. Weiss, The Child Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the
First Amendment, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 331 (1985) (citing S. REP. NO.
95–438, at 10 (1977) (finding six states had proscribed the use of children in
pornographic material)); Jennifer M. Payton, Note, Child Pornography
Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 519–20 (1978–1979) (finding one state had a
statute proscribing the same).
See Payton, supra note 59, at 511.
State Statutes—Child Pornography Possession, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS. ASS’N,
(Mar. 2010), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Child%20Pornography%20Possession
%20Statutes%203-2010.pdf.
Weiss, supra note 59, at 332.
See id. at 332–33.
Id. at 333.
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Sexual Exploitation Act was signed into law.65 “[P]remising its
jurisdiction over such activity as an extension of its command over
interstate commerce,”66 the federal statute barred the use of children in
the production of pornography.67
The definition of obscenity was a barrier to the enforcement of the
federal statute and to a rapidly increasing number of state laws
proscribing child pornography.68 In 1973, the Supreme Court
announced a legal definition of “obscenity” which hampered
prosecution under the federal statute and state equivalents.69 Miller v.
California70 was one of a family of pornography cases the Court
decided together.71 The holding in Miller, enunciated by Justice
Berger, stated:
In sum, we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is
not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such material
can be regulated by the States, subject to the specific safeguards
enunciated above, without a showing that the material is ‘utterly
without redeeming social value’; and (c) hold that obscenity is to
be determined by applying ‘contemporary community
72
standards,’ . . . not ‘national standards.’

By focusing the definition of “obscenity” on “contemporary
community standards,” it was difficult to establish a uniform manner
in which to enforce the federal and state child pornography statutes.73
In 1982, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of child
pornography in New York v. Ferber.74 Ferber involved a New York
statute “prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting a sexual
performance by a child under the age of sixteen by distributing
material which depicted such a performance,”75 Ferber, a bookstore

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 333 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253).
Id. at 334–335.
See generally id.
Weiss, supra note 59, at 336.
Id.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 36–37 (citations omitted).
See Weiss, supra note 59, at 336.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Id. at 747.
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owner, was convicted of violating the statute when he sold films
showing boys masturbating.76 Ferber’s argument, inter alia, was that
the films were protected speech under Miller.77 In upholding the
constitutionality of the New York statute, the Court noted:
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity
standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared to it for the
purpose of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in the
following respects: A trier of fact need not find that the material
appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently
offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered
as a whole. We note that the distribution of descriptions or other
depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not
involve live performance or photographic or other visual
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment
78
protection.

While Ferber did not specifically provide a legal definition for child
pornography, it provided guidelines which encouraged Congress to
revisit its earlier legislation proscribing child pornography.79 The
ultimate result was the Child Protection Act of 1984 (CPA).80
The Child Protection Act of 1984 amended the 1977 Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in several significant ways.
First, the CPA removed references to “obscenity” that had hindered
enforcement under the Miller standard.81 Second, the requirement that
the images be created for commercial purposes was removed.82 Third,
a new offense was created for “knowingly reproducing any visual
depiction of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct through the
mails.”83 Fourth, the age under which a child would be protected was

76
77
78
79
80

81

82
83

See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 764–65 (citations omitted).
Weiss, supra note 59, at 342.
Id. Weiss offers a detailed discussion of the path from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ferber to the signing of the Child Protection Act by President
Reagan. Id. at 342–48.
Annemarie J. Mazzone, Comment, United States v. Knox: Protecting Children
From Sexual Exploitation Through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA. & ENT. L.J. 167, 185 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 185–86.
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increased from sixteen to eighteen.84 Additionally, Congress replaced
the word “lewd,” which had been associated with the Miller obscenity
standard, with “lascivious.”85
Because of the difficulty in establishing a link between private
possession and interstate commerce, it is noteworthy that the federal
proscription of child pornography did not apply to privately owned
images or items otherwise prohibited by the statute. In other words,
possession of images of child pornography was not implicated in the
federal statute.86 States, however, were not necessarily so restricted.87
Several states enacted laws prohibiting private possession of child
pornography and by 1990 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to
address the issue in Osborne v. Ohio.88
Osborne involved an Ohio statute that prohibited the possession of
nude photographs of children.89 Osborne was convicted of violating
this statute after police seized four illegal images from his home. He
appealed his conviction on First Amendment grounds.90 In order to
hold that the Ohio statute did not violate the First Amendment, the
Court had to distinguish the case from Stanley.91 To do so, the Court
focused on the intent of the laws in question, noting that while Stanley
“sought to proscribe possession of obscenity because [the Georgia law
in question] was concerned that obscenity would poison the mind of its
viewers,” the intent of the Ohio law in question in Osborne was “to
protect the victims of child pornography [and] destroy a market for the
exploitative use of children.”92
Having disposed of the Stanley precedent, the Court applied strict
scrutiny and found that:

84

85

86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 186. Literally, the statute reduced the age from “under sixteen” to “under
eighteen.” Id.
Id. at 187. Additionally, in 1988 during the nascent years of computers,
Congress amended the federal child pornography statute by prohibiting the use
of computers to “transport, distribute, or receive” child pornography. Id.
Id. at 187.
Mazzone, supra note 81.
Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Anderson Supp.1990).
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
Id. at 109–10. See also supra III.B.
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (internal citations omitted).
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[i]t is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest
in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor’ is ‘compelling.’. . . The legislative judgment, as well as the
judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological,
emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think,
easily passes muster under the First Amendment. It is also surely
reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the
production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess
93
and view the product, thereby decreasing demand.

Again freed from First Amendment fetters, Congress amended the
federal child pornography laws.94 In a 1990 amendment, Congress
added the offense of possession of child pornography.95
The next major change to the federal pornography laws occurred in
1996.96 Concerned by the ease with which images could be
manipulated with computer technology, Congress passed the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996.97 The 1996 amendment
extended the definition of child pornography to include “virtual child
pornography.”98 Virtual child pornography is child pornography that
has not been created with real children.99
The 1996 extension of the federal law was challenged on First
Amendment grounds and was heard by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition.100 In a 6–3 opinion, the Court held:
By prohibiting child pornography that does not depict an actual
child, the statute goes beyond New York v. Ferber, which
distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit
speech because of the State’s interest in protecting the children

93
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Id. at 109–10 (internal citations omitted).
See Mazzone, supra note 81, at 191.
Id.
John Schwartz, New Law Expanding Legal Definition of Child Pornography
Draws Fire, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1996, at A10.
Id.
Id.
Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2007). Virtual child
pornography may be created, for example, with actors digitally manipulated to
look like children or by using animation. Id.
See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (presenting a
case challenging the virtual child pornography statute).
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exploited by the production process. As a general rule,
pornography can be banned only if obscene, but under Ferber,
pornography showing minors can be proscribed whether or not the
images are obscene under the definition set forth in Miller v.
California. Ferber recognized that ‘[t]he Miller standard, like all
general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not
reflect the State’s particular and more compelling interest in
prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of
101
children.’

Again, Congress responded, this time enacting the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Act of
2003 (the PROTECT Act).102 This act created a new crime for
“pandering or soliciting material” which “reflects the belief, or that is
intended to cause another to believe that it contains child
pornography.”103 Not unexpectedly, this law, too, made it to the
Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds in United States v.
Williams, where it was challenged as being overbroad and vague.104 In
upholding the constitutionality of the PROTECT Act, the Court
observed that the determination called for was fact-based, stating:
The statute requires that the defendant hold, and make a statement
that reflects, the belief that the material is child pornography; or
that he communicate in a manner intended to cause another so to
believe. Those are clear questions of fact . . . To be sure, it may be
difficult in some cases to determine whether these clear
requirements have been met. ‘But courts and juries every day pass
upon knowledge, belief and intent—the state of men’s minds—
having before them no more than evidence of their words and
conduct, from which, in ordinary human experience, mental
105
condition may be inferred.’

The Court ended its decision with the following observation:

101
102

103
104
105

Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 23 (2011). Several other laws were passed at this time
dealing with child pornography and abuse. Their relevance to this Note is not
material so they are not addressed.
See id. at 25 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)).
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
Id. at 306.
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Child pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of our
citizens. Both the State and Federal Governments have sought to
suppress it for many years, only to find it proliferating through the
new medium of the Internet. This Court held unconstitutional
Congress’s previous attempt to meet this new threat, and Congress
responded with a carefully crafted attempt to eliminate the First
Amendment problems we identified. As far as the provision at
106
issue in this case is concerned, that effort was successful.

Congress’ authority, of course, extends beyond statutes defining
federal crimes. Congress also sets penalties for violating those statutes.
C. Child Pornography Sentencing
As Congress amended the federal child pornography statutes, it
also increased the penalties for violation107 by increasing the minimum
and maximum penalties for the offenses associated with child
pornography.108 Importantly, sentence-enhancements were added
which increased penalties based upon the details of the offense.109 For
example, the number of images possessed and the age of the children
depicted results in a sentence-enhancement.110 Interestingly, using a

106
107

108
109

110

Id. at 307.
Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing:
Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 545, 552
(2011).
Id. at 552.
See generally Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A
Primer on the Flawed Progression of Child Pornography Guidelines, OFFICE OF
DEFENDER SERVS. (2009), http://www.fd.org/docs/Select-Topics—-sentencing
/child-porn-july-revision.pdf.
Id. at 26.
Base Offense Level: (a)(1): 18 if a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1466A(b) or § 2252(a)(4) or § 2252A(a)(5)(a)(2): 22 otherwise;
BUT If (a)(2), + conduct was limited to receipt or solicitation, + no
intent to traffic or distribute, then -2. Specific Characteristics:
(b)(1) prepubescent or a minor under 12 years +2; (b)(2) if
distribution A) For pecuniary gain, see 2B1.1, but not less than +5;
B) For value but not pecuniary gain +5; C) To a minor +5; D) To a
minor to persuade the minor to engage in illegal activity other than
E) +6; E) To persuade a minor to engage in sexual conduct +7; F)
Other than for the reasons above +2; (b)(3) if material portrays
sadistic or masochistic conduct, or other violence, +4; (b)(4)
Pattern of Abuse +5; (b)(5) transmission of material or notice by
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computer to access pornography increases the sentence that may be
imposed.111
An oft-cited example of the effect of these changes provides the
clearest depiction of the consequences of sentence escalation. The
example originated in a paper by Troy Stabenow.112 In his paper,
Stabenow compares hypothetical defendants.113 Defendant #2114 is
convicted of possession of child pornography.115 Stabenow provides
the following characteristics for Defendant #2:
Possessed a picture depicting a child under the age of twelve
Used a computer to obtain the image
Had one disk containing two movie files and ten pictures, equating
to 160 pictures
[H]as no criminal history and has never abused or exploited a
child.
[P]leads guilty in a timely fashion and receives the maximum
116
standard reduction for acceptance of responsibility

Depending upon when Defendant #2 was convicted, his sentence
range would be as follows:
April 30, 1987: No punishment—not illegal
November 1, 1991: 6–12 months
November 27, 1991: 12–18 months
November 1, 1996: 21–27 months
April 30, 2003: 30–37 months
117

November 1, 2004: 41–51 months

computer +2; (b)(6) If A) 10–150 images +2; B) 150–300 +3; C)
300–600 +4 D) 600+ +5.
111
112
113
114

115
116
117

Id.
Id.
Id. at 26–30.
Id.
Defendant #1 is charged with distribution of child pornography and is thus not
relevant to this discussion.
Stabenow, supra note 109, at 28.
Id. at 28 (omitting the percent of typical defendants represented).
Id. at 29.
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By comparison, Stabenow then considers the federal sentence
guidelines for a hypothetical physical offender.118 The physical
offender is a fifty-year-old man who meets a thirteen-year-old girl on
the Internet and successfully persuades her to meet him and have
sex.119 “[T]he Guideline range for this Category I offender would be
37–46 months.”120
Observe the stunning difference between the crimes and the
punishments. Defendant #2 has not committed a physical sex offense
involving a minor. The fifty-year-old man has. Both crimes are sex
crimes against minors. Both offenders are charged, convicted, and
sentenced under the federal guidelines. Defendant #2, however,
receives a greater sentence than the physical offender.121
IV. EXPANDING PRETRIAL DIVERSION TO ADDRESS POSSESSION OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Today, under federal law and all state laws, possession of child
pornography generally results in a felony conviction, incarceration for
up to ten years, and mandatory registration as a sex offender for at
least fifteen years.122 There is no doubt that a felony conviction and
registration as a sex offender, even at the lowest level, curtails one’s
ability to live and work.123The inability to find a job, and the fact that a
sex offender must carefully choose where to live and monitor with
whom he or she associates, forces many registered sex offenders to
live in increased isolation and arguably results in a return to the online
behavior that led to the initial conviction.124

118
119
120
121
122

123
124

Id.
Id.
Stabenow, supra note 109, at 29.
Id. (emphasis added).
State Statutes—Child Pornography Possession, supra note 61, (noting that the
maximum sentence for possession at the federal level has been increased since
Stabenow’s report); Id. at 96, (also noting that possession combined with, e.g.,
prior offenses carries a minimum ten year sentence and a maximum twenty year
sentence).
See Hamilton, supra note 107, at 563–64.
See Ethel Quayle et. al., Sex Offenders, Internet Child Abuse Images and
Emotional Avoidance: The Importance of Values, 11 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR 1 (2006) (providing that often those using child pornography do so
because of isolation or underlying addiction, depression issues).
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Perhaps many of the offenders charged with possession of child
pornography should be so restricted.125 But what about the nineteenyear-old boy who goes off to college and for the first time acquires
unfettered Internet access?126 Should he be branded with a felony
conviction for the rest of his life and the label of sex offender until he
is in his late thirties?127 Or like a similarly situated nineteen-year-old
drug offender, should he be considered for further evaluation and
possible treatment in lieu of prosecution?
A. Risk and Needs Assessment
To qualify for a pretrial diversion program, the offender must
demonstrate certain eligibility.128 Eligibility generally depends upon
the nature of the offense and can include the risk of recidivism and the
identification of viable rehabilitation services.129 For example, Miami
Dade County diverts drug offenders to a drug court system that
manages the pretrial program.130 An offender qualifies for drug court
in Dade County if he has no history of violent crime, has no prior
arrests for drug sales or trafficking, and has no more than two previous

125

126

127

128
129
130

For example, if a possessor of child pornography is an active trader in child
pornography, he will likely fail many of the risk tests that are used today to
determine likelihood of reoffending. Troy Stabenow, A Method for Careful
Study: A Proposal for Reforming the Child Pornography Guidelines, 24 FED.
SENT’G REP. 108, 116 (2011). Similarly, an offender who is likely to reoffend
will not generally be a candidate for pretrial probation. See supra Part II.C.
Because high schools are permitted to restrict Internet access and most parents
have put Internet filtering in place at home, most young men and women first
experience unrestricted Internet access at university. See Children’s Internet
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2012) (restricting funding to public primary
and secondary schools who do not filter harmful material from the Internet);
Amanda Lenhart, Protecting Teens Online, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT
1, 7–8 (March 17, 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Report
.pdf (finding over fifty-four percent of parents used internet filters in the home
in 2005, predicting growth to sixty-five percent by 2009).
Or, perhaps age forty because getting to trial or even to a pretrial plea bargaining
can sometimes take years.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 24.
See supra Part II.C.
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non-drug-related felony convictions.131 Similarly, the Essex County
Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) in New Jersey considers all
offenders charged with criminal or penal offenses except those with
minor violations likely to result in a suspended sentence.132 However,
New Jersey’s PTI program excludes those who have previously been
diverted, or convicted, and those currently serving parole or
probation.133
When considering offenders charged with possession of child
pornography, eligibility may be divided into two areas of
consideration—general eligibility and specific eligibility. General
eligibility would be based on facts similar to those of the Miami Dade
drug court and New Jersey PTI program.134 The general eligibility
would be a threshold condition. If an offender does not satisfy these
general conditions, he or she cannot be considered for the option.
Specific eligibility would rely upon a psychological determination
of an offender’s ability to be accepted into, and respond positively to,
treatment. In Massachusetts, for example, a district court judge may
refer a candidate for diversion to the director of a program.135 The
director of the program has fourteen days to perform an analysis of the
defendant and provide a report to determine if the candidate will be
able to benefit from the services.136

131

132

133
134

135

136

Miami Dade County Drug Works, Who is Eligible for Drug Court, MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY DRUG COURT, http://www.miamidrugcourt.com/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=54.
New Jersey Courts, Pre Trial Intervention Program, http://www.judiciary.state.
nj.us/criminal/crpti.htm (last visited May 9, 2014).
Id.
Supra notes 131–32. Note that the Miami Dade and New Jersey examples, as
well as the examples given above, in supra Part II.C, are illustrative of the
numerous programs available. This Note proposes that each jurisdiction should
use the eligibility criteria it already has in place.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276A, § 5 (2012). Under Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 276A a program is defined as including, but not limited to, “medical,
educational, vocational, social and psychological services, corrective and
preventive guidance, training, performance of community service work,
counseling, provision for residence in a halfway house or other suitable place,
and other rehabilitative services designed to protect the public and benefit the
individual.” Id. at § 1.
Id.
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When considering possession of child pornography, the issue
becomes whether there is a way to perform risk assessment evaluations
that can be associated with treatment. This is a controversial issue.
There is a “moral panic about the sexual exploitation of children”137
that has been the driving force behind the severe penalties for those
convicted of possession of child pornography.138 One author referred
to this as punishment by proxy.139 Because of the public’s fear of those
who physically harm children, society treats those who view such acts
as equally culpable and punishes them accordingly.140 The flames of
fear were further fueled by an oft-cited and provocatively titled study
published in 2006.141 The study indicated that possession of child
pornography was a valid indicator of the likelihood to commit future
physical crimes against children.142 The primary author of that report,
however, continued his research and published a series of follow-up
analyses.143 The author has more recently reported that “the research
has shown that relatively few child pornography offenders go on to
commit sexual offenses, that are detected by authorities.”144 In fact,
current scientific evidence taken from multiple studies linking
possession of child pornography to physical child molestation shows:
Child pornography consumption sometimes correlates to
pedophilia, and many child pornography consumers report a past
history of abuse (i.e., dual offending histories). However, child
pornography consumption on its own does not appear to correlate
to a significant risk that an offender will progress to a contact
offense or recidivate generally post-conviction. Overall recidivism
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139
140
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144

Hamilton, supra note 107, at 547.
Supra Part II.B.
Hamilton, supra note 107, at 548.
Id.
See generally Michael C. Seto et. al., Child Pornography Offenses Are a Valid
Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 610 (Aug.
2006).
Id.
See, e.g., Angela W. Eke, Michael C. Seto, & Jennette Williams, Examining the
Criminal History and Future Offending of Child Pornography Offenders: An
Extended Prospective Follow-up Study, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 466, 472
(2011).
Michael C. Seto, Assessing the Risk Posed by Child Pornography Offenders, 2
G8 GLOBAL SYMPOSIUM AT THE UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL
(2009), available at http://txn.fd.org/Seto_Position_Paper.pdf.
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rates are very low across all demographics for these offenses,
although offenders with prior criminal histories are more likely to
recidivate, as are those with concurrent violent offenses (including
contact sexual offenses) to their child pornography crimes.
Overall, child pornography offenders appear to be far more
compliant with supervision than other offender populations, and
recidivism rates for offenders on supervision or in treatment are
145
particularly low.

If the real risk that possessors of child pornography will escalate to
become physical offenders is low, then the next question is whether
there is a way to assess an individual offender’s risk to reoffend. The
answer to this question is yes. Tests have long been established and
accepted by law enforcement and the courts to determine a sex
offender’s attraction to children.146 Many jurisdictions have
established mandatory testing for sex offenders that determine their
eligible for release after incarceration.147
General eligibility criteria for entry into pretrial probation exist.
Consistent and recent research indicates that offenders who have
possessed child pornography are not at risk to escalate to child abuse.
To ensure individual offenders are not a threat, existing risk
assessment protocols used to evaluate sex offenders can be used. No
risk assessment hurdle exists to prevent these offenders from being
considered for pretrial diversion.
B. Services
Successful diversion programs marry services with treatment.148
Drug and alcohol offenders who enter pretrial diversion programs are
generally compelled to attend substance abuse treatment, mental health

145
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148

Stabenow, supra note 109, at 121(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, Sex Offender Risk
Assessment (June 30, 2006), http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45355
(suggesting six different tests); Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, Best Practices Tool-Kit: Sex Offender Assessment and Treatment
(Oct. 2009), http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/iej_files/SO_AssessmentTreatment
.pdf (recommending four different sex offender evaluations); Washington State
Institute for Public Policy, Risk Assessment Instruments to Predict Recidivism of
Sex Offenders: Practices in Washington State (June 2008), http://www
.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/08-06-1101.pdf (listing the risk assessment tools used by
Washington for both juvenile and adult sex offenders).
See id.
Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 13.
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treatment, and counseling.149 Some special diversion programs
targeted at veterans also provide job and education services as well.150
Treatment is designed to address the root cause of the offense in light
of the offender’s needs and demographics—in short, to ensure
success.151
Programs for treating convicted sex offenders exist today.152 Often
they involve counseling and cognitive behavior therapy.153 Generally,
the same types of post-release counseling that have been available and
provided to date can be used in a pretrial diversion setting. Treatment
opportunities are also expanding. Accepting, arguendo, that the vast
majority of offenders obtain child pornography via the Internet,154 an
issue that has been greatly discussed is the legitimacy of Internet
addiction, otherwise known as Internet abuse disorder.155 Viewed with
mixed feelings by clinicians and the media,156 Internet abuse disorder
appears to be emerging as a legitimate psychiatric concern.157 The fifth
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Id. at 12.
See, e.g., Kate Cahoy, Jon Fougner, Sofia Nelson, & Eric Parrie, SB 114:
IMPROVING PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION TO MEET THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF
CONNECTICUT’S VETERANS 3 (2012) available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/Clinics/SB114White_Paper.pdf.
See generally Thomas E. Ulrich supra note 4, at 34–35.
See supra note 147.
See generally Ethel Quayle et. al, supra note 124, at 1 (discussing cognitive
therapy as one current treatment used for sex offenders).
G. Patrick Black & Kenneth R. Hawk, II, Computer Crimes &
Computer/Internet Based Child Pornography Crimes, DEFN’DR SERVS. OFFICE
OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE UNITED STATES COURTS, at 22 (Feb., 2012)
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/WS2012/Computer_Crimes101.pdf (noting that child
pornography saw a resurgence that started in the 1990s due to online access).
American Psychiatric Association, APA Corrects New York Times Article on
Changes to DSM-5′s Substance Use Disorders, (June 12, 2012), available at
http://dsmfacts.org/issue-accuracy/apa-corrects-new-york-times-article-onchanges-to-dsm-5s-substance-use-disorders/.
Compare Brent S. Colasurdo, Note, Behavioral Addictions and the Law, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 161 (2010) (arguing against legally recognizing behavioral
addictions because there is no chemical dependency), with Blake R. Bertagna,
Internet—Disability or Distraction? An Analysis of Whether “Internet
Addiction” Can Qualify as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 419 (2008) (arguing that Internet addiction
should be recognized by the Americans with Disability Act).
See generally American Psychiatric Association, supra note 156.
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edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) is scheduled for release in May
2013.158 The DSM-V lists “Internet use disorder” in the section
dedicated to areas which have been recommended for “further study
before they should be considered disorders . . . [in order to] encourage
research on the condition.”159 Presumably, inclusion in the DSM-V
can be expected to result in more specific treatments targeted at
Internet abuse by viewers of child pornography.
As with risk assessments, treatment programs are in place and in
use by the courts and probation departments for post-release treatment.
New, more targeted, treatments may not be far behind. An inability to
provide treatment programs for offenders is not an obstacle to
providing pretrial diversion for child pornography possessors.
C. Supervision
Successful pretrial diversion programs require supervision.160
Pretrial diversion is a second chance and, given that opportunity, the
offender is required to follow the terms of his diversion. Supervision
ensures the terms of the diversion are being met.161 Depending upon
the offence, supervision may entail random drug screens, verification
of attendance at treatment programs, and the offender “checking in”
regularly with the supervising officer.
Existing pretrial diversion programs often provide supervision
through a jurisdiction’s probation office or pre-trial service
agencies.162 As it pertains to possession of child pornography, the
supervision will include utilization of resources that are already in
place—meetings with the supervisory officer, verification that
treatment is occurring, and confirmation that other conditions of the
diversion are being met.163 There is no doubt that additional resources
will be needed to supervise the increased number of diverted
offenders, but the costs of adding those resources can be covered by
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See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
American Psychiatric Association, supra note 156.
Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, supra note 1, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.

AND

332

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 306

the overall savings in other areas.164 Indeed, the savings discussed in
supra II-D included the costs of additional probation resources.
There are no significant barriers to providing supervision to
offenders charged with possession of child pornography. Indeed, of the
three items discussed in this section, providing supervision should be
the least difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
Pretrial diversion is an option available throughout the country for
low-risk offenders who can benefit from treatment. It provides those
offenders with an opportunity to turn themselves around, rather than
face incarceration and the stigma of a conviction. It is a successful and
cost-effective alternative to incarceration for those offenders who meet
the requirements.
Possession of child pornography is a sex offense and, therefore,
defendants charged with possession of child pornography are not
eligible for pretrial diversion. This stems in part from the public’s fear
of child abuse and the belief that those who are viewing the abuse are
either as morally culpable as those who perform it, or are also capable
of becoming a physical offender. This over-inclusive view results in
harsh sentencing guidelines at the federal level. In many cases,
possessors of child pornography are incarcerated for longer periods of
time than those who actually abused the child. The result is that all
possessors risk not only a felony conviction, but also face registration
as a sex offender for a minimum of fifteen years.
Studies indicate, however, that defendants accused of possession of
child pornography are potentially successful subjects for diversion.
They generally meet the guidelines regarding prior offenses and age.
Risk assessment is currently available, as is treatment. Apart from
society’s repugnance of the crime and its fears of what these offenders
represent, or theoretically may do, there is arguably no reason not to
consider them for pretrial diversion.

164

See supra Part II.D and discussion therein.

